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Commercial transplant tourism results in significant harm to both kidney donors and recipients. However,
proponents of incentives for kidney donation assert that proper oversight of the process prevents these harms and
also that transplant numbers can be safely increased so that the moral burden of poor end-stage kidney disease
outcomes can be alleviated. In a moral dilemma analysis, the principle of preventing donor harm can be dissociated
from the principles of providing benefits to the recipient and to society. It is plausible that an incentivized donor is
fundamentally different from an uncompensated donor. Incentivized donors can experience harms unrelated to lack
of regulation because their characteristics are determined by the incentive superimposed upon a poverty circumstance.
Moreover, creating a system of incentivized donation without established national registries for capturing all long-term
donor outcomes would be morally inconsistent, since without prior demonstration that donor outcomes are not
income or wealth-dependent, a population of incentivized donors cannot be morally created in a clinical trial.
Socioeconomic factors adversely affect outcome in other surgical populations, and interventions on income or wealth
in these populations have not been studied. Coercion will be increased in families not affected by kidney disease,
where knowledge of a new income source and not of a potential recipient is the incentive. In the case of elective
surgery such as kidney donation, donor non-maleficence trumps donor autonomy, recipient beneficence, and
beneficence to society when there is a conflict among these principles. Yet, we are still faced with the total moral
burden of end-stage kidney disease, which belongs to the society that cannot provide enough donor kidneys. Acting
according to one arm of the dilemma to prevent donor harm does not erase obligations towards the other, to provide
recipient benefit. To resolve the moral burden, as moral agents, we must rearrange our institutions by increasing
available donor organs from other sources. The shortage of donor kidneys creates a moral burden for society, but
incentives for donation will only increase the total moral burden of end-stage kidney disease.
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Transplant tourism is widely condemned [1], but proposals
exist for domestic regulated systems of incentives for living
kidney donation [2]. Premises such as regulated fair price,
third party payment and recipient selection, assurance of
long-term health care for donors, and respect for donor
and recipient autonomy are commonly employed in advan-
cing arguments for such regulated systems of incentives.
Motivation includes increasing total transplant numbers
and cost savings to health care systems. Persuasive argu-
ments against incentive-based systems must show them to
be morally distinguishable from uncompensated donationCorrespondence: prasadr@smh.ca
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creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/[2]. This commentary argues that this moral distinction
can be made and that a clinical trial of incentivized dona-
tion [2] will therefore lack moral grounding.The moral dilemma approach
The moral dilemma is a useful tool that can be used to
analyze many life situations. In a moral dilemma, one
ought to do x and ought to do y, but one cannot do both
simultaneously. When framed as a moral dilemma, on
the one hand, we ought to safely increase total kidney
transplant numbers, and on the other, we ought to pre-
vent harm to incentivized kidney donors, but we cannot
do both together. When properly framed in this manner,
each dilemma arm must first be supported, and a reso-
lution then proposed. There is no controversy aboutdistributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
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dilemma’s first arm. More contentious is the dilemma’s
second arm, according to which regulated incentive sys-
tems cause donor harm, and which will therefore be dis-
cussed at length. Although poor outcomes in incentivized
donors have been reported worldwide [3–5], proponents
of incentives indicate that effective regulation will elimin-
ate organ trafficking and poor outcomes; moreover, pro-
hibition of compensation eliminates a chance at poverty
alleviation [2].
There are three parties involved in incentivized dona-
tion: donors, recipients, and society. In a moral analysis,
the principle of preventing donor harm must be dissoci-
ated from the principle of providing benefits to recipi-
ents or to society. High-quality studies demonstrate
safety in regulated uncompensated donation [6]. Un-
compensated donors assume the moral burden of their
decision to undergo surgery and experience its conse-
quences, all for the recipient’s benefit. Incentivized
donor decisions instead are driven by the incentive and
are unlinked to the recipient’s benefit. The moral burden
for the decision to proceed with surgery rests therefore
with the inducing society and to health professionals as
society’s representative, but not the donor. Health pro-
fessionals will not propose pilot studies of a non-
clinically indicated cholecystectomy or appendectomy
because no other party’s interest is involved, and they
will not assume that moral burden. Surveys of patients
with kidney disease and the general public about com-
pensated donation [7–10] are used to strengthen argu-
ments for incentives as moral justification, but these
surveys are designed to capture the opinion of recipients
and society, not that of incentivized donors themselves.
Incentivized donor opinion is needed for the moral bur-
den of end-stage kidney disease to be comprehensively
assessed.
Incentivized donors may be fundamentally different
from other donors and therefore prone to different out-
comes. Survey data from previously incentivized donors
[3] remains relevant because it is the incentivized donor
who is exposed to potential harm. For example, Indian
donors experienced health deterioration despite excel-
lent baseline health, and also worsened financially,
recommending that others not similarly give up their
kidneys [3]. Persistent backache and nephrectomy site
pain are phenomena not readily explainable by neph-
rectomy. In Iran, quality of life scores were inferior to
that of the general population [4]. In Pakistan, general
health status deteriorated in 98 % of donors deliberately
sought out post-surgery [5]. Medical care in these
countries cannot readily be dismissed as primitive. It is
therefore plausible that adverse outcomes were due not
to improper regulation but rather inherent donor char-
acteristics. Poor psychological conditioning resultingfrom the need to overcome fear-based stress responses
instead of experiencing altruistic feelings of reward, or
a fundamentally altered self-image post-nephrectomy
rather than unrecognized contraindications to nephrec-
tomy or poor surgical technique cannot be prevented by
regulation, because a system immune from abuse cannot
change donor characteristics regardless of the country of
origin of the donors. These donor characteristics may have
been selected out by the incentive that has been superim-
posed upon a poverty circumstance.
Incentivized donors are likely to be in poverty, even in
regulated systems. Society does not object to impover-
ished individuals autonomously assuming risky jobs [2].
However, work options in poverty are often limited to
physical labor and could become limited further if exist-
ing incentivized donor experiences [3–5] are respected.
Employment options in poverty in developing countries
are unlikely to differ substantially from those in richer
jurisdictions where incentives are being proposed. Pov-
erty may be perpetuated or worsened. Incentives will not
improve educational opportunities as a means of poverty
alleviation since access to education depends on much
more than financial means.
Donors from retrospective long-term donor follow-up
studies [6] do not represent the demographic of incen-
tivized donors. Studies of donor outcomes do not focus
on economic disadvantage as a variable. Incentivized do-
nation without established national donor registries to
capture all donor outcomes is morally inconsistent, since
without prior demonstration that donor outcomes are
not income or wealth-dependent, a population of incen-
tivized donors cannot morally be created. Up to 25 % of
current living donors have medical conditions associated
with future health risk [11]. True informed consent is
not possible in trials of incentives because there are no
prior favorable donor data from non-trial studies of in-
centives in order to promote clinical equipoise, while
true informed consent is possible in the case of uncom-
pensated donation because abundant safety data exists.
With sparse long-term data for incentivized donors,
examining the relationship between income and out-
comes in other surgical populations is immediately help-
ful. Socioeconomic factors adversely affect outcome in
kidney [12], liver [13–15], and lung [16] transplant re-
cipients. Similar information is available for patients
undergoing cardiac surgery [17, 18], prostatectomy [19],
neurosurgery [20], and colorectal surgery [21]. Although
these findings may not be universal, data from other sur-
gical populations in developed countries needs close
examination first, because the underlying mechanism for
these poor outcomes remains largely unknown. Even if
donation is always cautiously approached in economically
disadvantaged candidates, excluding them from incentiv-
ized donation would be paradoxical since a purported
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donors. Health professionals do not suggest a clinical trial
to examine the effects of financial gifts in any other surgi-
cal population because no other party’s interest is in-
volved. Incentives to alter adverse outcomes need to be
tested first in obligated surgical populations, not to gain
advantage from elective surgical populations. Clinical
equipoise to justify a clinical trial that intentionally creates
a new elective surgical population of incentivized donors
is lacking.
Significant financial transactions can occur in all donor-
recipient relationships. Even without a reliable method for
their capture, transplantation must continue. However, ra-
ther than being occasional instances, such transactions are
institutionalized by incentivized donation and can only en-
courage their occurrence in all living donation. Some
current living donation also possibly occurs by coercion.
A medically suitable family member may be compelled to
donate a kidney to a relative. Transplant programs at-
tempt to identify such cases and prevent these transplants.
With incentivized donation, a new form of coercion is be-
ing introduced, within families that are not affected by
kidney disease. Knowledge of a new income source is now
the cause of coercion, and so, there will be a new popula-
tion of coerced donors. Transplant programs support re-
luctant donors to opt-out of surgery in support of the
donor’s autonomy and to prevent long-term, non-surgical
harm to the donor. In incentive-based systems, there will
be opt-in reasons unrelated to poverty alleviation, some of
which will be possibly illegal. Yet, moral consistency would
require that the principle of autonomy preservation respect
these reasons to donate.
To summarize, the second arm of the moral dilemma,
that we ought to prevent harm to incentivized kidney do-
nors, is clearly supported by the lack of favorable outcomes
in previously incentivized donors to promote equipoise, no
clear relation of these outcomes to deficient regulation,
lack of registries to capture all long-term donor outcomes,
potential for increased poverty, relationship of wealth or
income to outcome in other surgical populations, and in-
creased coercion. Since incentives appear to strengthen
and not resolve the moral dilemma, the moral burden from
the shortage of available kidneys is increased, not de-
creased by a regulated system of incentivized donation.
Resolution of the moral dilemma
Since we cannot both increase total transplant numbers
and prevent incentivized donor harm, how do we
proceed? One method is specification. Specification
works with norms that are not universal generalizations
and allow us to articulate our reasons openly and pub-
licly [22]. Specification narrows a norm by adding more
information, preventing vagueness contained in terms
like “fair compensation” or “dignity and appreciation.”For incentivized donation, additional specifications that
border on impossible to fulfil are required. Favorable
data from existing incentive systems, study of baseline
wealth on outcomes from kidney donor registries, and
study of altering wealth by payment on outcomes in ob-
ligated, non-elective surgical populations are required to
meet the basic moral norm for a clinical trial of incen-
tives for donation, however, limited in scope.
Beauchamp and Childress describe autonomy, benefi-
cence, non-maleficence, and justice as the normative stan-
dards of conduct [23]. When these conflict [24], an appeal
is to be made to common morality. Common morality is
the organizing meta-principle and constraining principle of
moral reasoning. A pertinent document of common mor-
ality is the Declaration of Helsinki’s principles of duty to
the patient over society and the recognition of increased
vulnerability of individuals or groups in research. While
donor autonomy is to be respected as a standard, donor
non-maleficence cannot be achieved with incentives
because it may have no relation to regulation. Donor
non-maleficence therefore trumps autonomy. Recipient
beneficence is also trumped by donor non-maleficence be-
cause unlike with uncompensated donation, the donor has
no interest in the recipient. Since financial gifts are
untested in other surgical populations, donor non-
maleficence also trumps beneficence to society.
The total moral burden of end-stage kidney disease be-
longs to the society that cannot provide enough donor kid-
neys. Acting with good reasons according to one arm of
the dilemma, to increase kidney transplant numbers, does
not erase obligations towards the other, to prevent donor
harm. The second-order principle in this situation is that
as moral agents, we must arrange our institutions to
minimize such conflicts [25]. Increasing available donor
kidneys from other sources is the only option. Promising
initiatives in previously important incentive-based jurisdic-
tions [3] to increase deceased donor transplantation [26]
or more novel initiatives such as donation after cardiac
death [27] and domino transplants [28] all act in accord-
ance with this second-order principle. It requires consider-
able dedication and investment to act according to morally
sound second-order principles. On the other hand, quickly
creating a new group of at-risk incentivized donors only
adds to the total moral burden of end-stage kidney disease.
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